jens
20c24f5a03
A stray /var/www/html/.htaccess (dated 2025-02-18, predating everything else in TODO.md) was silently requiring HTTP Basic Auth for jayfield.org and www.jayfield.org's shared DocumentRoot, 401ing every real visitor to the intentionally-public static site. Removed (backed up, not deleted). Also adds a README table auditing which public hostnames do/don't require credentials, prompted by checking this.
138 lines
8.5 KiB
Markdown
138 lines
8.5 KiB
Markdown
# alpha.jayfield.org — TODO
|
|
|
|
Outstanding hardening items (see `README.md` for the full service overview).
|
|
Nothing here is urgent; all are low-risk, no-downtime changes.
|
|
|
|
- [x] **Public static site (`jayfield.org`/`www.jayfield.org`) was 401'ing every visitor** — done 2026-07-20
|
|
Found while auditing which services are reachable without credentials:
|
|
a stray `/var/www/html/.htaccess` (`AuthType Basic`, same
|
|
`AuthName "Restricted Content"`/`AuthUserFile /etc/apache2/.htpasswd`
|
|
as the intentional `dyndns.jayfield.org` protection) was silently
|
|
requiring login for the DocumentRoot both `jayfield.org` and
|
|
`www.jayfield.org` share — `/var/www` has `AllowOverride all`, so it
|
|
took effect with no vhost-level directive needed. File was dated
|
|
2025-02-18 (`index.html`/`apache.html` themselves are from 2022) —
|
|
predates every other change in this doc by well over a year, almost
|
|
certainly a forgotten leftover rather than intentional, and
|
|
contradicts `README.md`'s own description of both as a public static
|
|
site.
|
|
Fixed: moved to `/root/removed-configs-backup/htaccess-var-www-html.<timestamp>`
|
|
(recoverable, not deleted — same convention as this file's other
|
|
removed-config backups). No Apache reload needed (`.htaccess` is
|
|
read per-request). Verified both `jayfield.org` and
|
|
`www.jayfield.org` now return `200` with real page content;
|
|
`dyndns.jayfield.org`'s own (intentional, vhost-level) Basic Auth is
|
|
untouched and still returns `401` without credentials.
|
|
|
|
- [x] **Lock down the dyndns TSIG key file permissions** — done 2026-07-19
|
|
`/etc/bind/dyndns.jayfield.org.key` was `644` (world-readable), holding
|
|
the shared secret that authenticates dynamic DNS updates for
|
|
`dyndns.jayfield.org` with no IP-based `allow-update` backing it up.
|
|
Fixed: `chmod 640` + `chown root:bind` (owner was already correct),
|
|
matching `rndc.key`'s permissions.
|
|
|
|
- [x] **Suppress BIND version disclosure** — done 2026-07-19
|
|
No `version` statement in `named.conf.options`, so
|
|
`dig CH TXT version.bind @ns1.jayfield.org` leaked the exact BIND
|
|
version (`9.18.39`) — a minor fingerprinting aid for attackers.
|
|
Fixed: added `version "unknown";` inside the `options {}` block,
|
|
validated with `named-checkconf`, and applied via `rndc reload`.
|
|
Verified `dig CH TXT version.bind` now returns `"unknown"`.
|
|
|
|
- [x] **Add response rate limiting (RRL)** — done 2026-07-19
|
|
No `rate-limit {}` block was configured. Since `allow-query { any; }`
|
|
is required for a public authoritative zone, RRL is the standard
|
|
mitigation against the server being used for spoofed-source DNS
|
|
reflection/amplification against third parties.
|
|
Fixed: added `rate-limit { responses-per-second 10; window 5; }` to
|
|
`named.conf.options`, validated with `named-checkconf`, and applied
|
|
via `rndc reload`. Started with conservative defaults (10/s, 5s
|
|
window) — revisit if legitimate high-volume resolvers get throttled.
|
|
|
|
- [x] **Add HSTS headers to all vhosts** — done 2026-07-19
|
|
No vhost sent a `Strict-Transport-Security` header, leaving a window
|
|
for on-path SSL-stripping on a user's very first plaintext request to
|
|
any domain.
|
|
Fixed: added `Header always set Strict-Transport-Security
|
|
"max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains"` to all 6 domain `:443` blocks
|
|
(`dyndns`, `jayfield.org`, `www`, `mail`, `web`, `cloud`) — skipped
|
|
`default-ssl.conf` since it's the self-signed catch-all with no real
|
|
trusted hostname for a browser to pin. Validated with
|
|
`apache2ctl configtest`, applied via `systemctl reload apache2`,
|
|
verified live with `curl -sI` against all 6 domains.
|
|
|
|
- [x] **`jayfield.org` had no `:80` vhost of its own** — done 2026-07-19
|
|
Bare `http://jayfield.org` fell through to the `dyndns` default vhost
|
|
and redirected to the wrong domain.
|
|
Fixed: added a `:80` block to `jayfield.org.conf` redirecting to
|
|
`https://jayfield.org/`, matching the `dyndns`/`mail` pattern.
|
|
Verified: `curl -sI http://jayfield.org/` → `302` with
|
|
`Location: https://jayfield.org/`.
|
|
|
|
- [x] **SSH: disable root login + password auth** — done 2026-07-19
|
|
`PermitRootLogin yes` and `PasswordAuthentication yes` were both still
|
|
enabled (the "known deviation" flagged in `SETUP.md` §1) — every
|
|
credential-stuffing bot on the internet got a real login prompt to
|
|
grind against.
|
|
Fixed: `PermitRootLogin no`, `PasswordAuthentication no`,
|
|
`PubkeyAuthentication yes` in `/etc/ssh/sshd_config` (backed up as
|
|
`sshd_config.bak.20260719225249`). The `Match Group sftp` block's own
|
|
`PasswordAuthentication yes` was left as-is — separate, already-chrooted,
|
|
no-shell/no-forwarding accounts, not part of this risk. Validated with
|
|
`sshd -t`, applied via `systemctl reload sshd`, verified live with
|
|
`sshd -T` and a fresh key-only connection before considering it done.
|
|
|
|
- [x] **Portainer's `:9443` UI is unreachable in HSTS-enforcing browsers** — done 2026-07-20
|
|
`https://alpha.jayfield.org:9443` threw
|
|
`MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT` in Firefox with no click-through
|
|
option ("keine Ausnahme kann hinzugefügt werden"). Root cause: the
|
|
`includeSubDomains` HSTS policy sent by the real `alpha.jayfield.org`
|
|
vhost (`Strict-Transport-Security` header, added in the item above)
|
|
pins the *hostname* to HTTPS-with-a-trusted-cert on every port, but
|
|
Portainer (`README.md` §Docker services) was still serving its stock
|
|
self-signed cert directly on `9443`. Not a MITM — self-inflicted by
|
|
combining HSTS with an unproxied self-signed service.
|
|
Fixed: added a `portainer` A record to `db.jayfield.org` (SOA serial
|
|
`2022032216` → `2022032217`); recreated the `portainer` container
|
|
binding the HTTPS UI to `127.0.0.1:9443:9443` instead of publishing it
|
|
(old container kept renamed until the new one was verified, then
|
|
removed, matching the update procedure documented in `README.md`);
|
|
added an Apache vhost for `portainer.jayfield.org`
|
|
(`ProxyPass`/`ProxyPassReverse` to `https://127.0.0.1:9443/`,
|
|
`SSLProxyEngine on`, `SSLProxyVerify none` + `SSLProxyCheckPeerCN off`/
|
|
`SSLProxyCheckPeerName off` for the loopback hop to Portainer's
|
|
self-signed cert) — same pattern as `web.jayfield.org`/
|
|
`cloud.jayfield.org` (`SETUP.md` §4/§5); issued a real cert via
|
|
`certbot --apache -d portainer.jayfield.org --redirect`; added the
|
|
standard HSTS header. Left the `8000` edge-agent tunnel port
|
|
published as-is — no evidence it's in use.
|
|
Verified: `openssl s_client`/`curl` confirm the Let's Encrypt cert
|
|
(not self-signed) and `Strict-Transport-Security` header on
|
|
`https://portainer.jayfield.org`, `http://` redirects 301 to
|
|
`https://`, and `ss -ltnp` shows `9443` bound to `127.0.0.1` only
|
|
(via `docker-proxy`), so it's no longer reachable on the public
|
|
interface at all — access is now exclusively via
|
|
`https://portainer.jayfield.org`.
|
|
One transient wrinkle during rollout: the very first few requests
|
|
through the new proxy vhost returned a stray `401` with dyndns's
|
|
Basic Auth realm ("Restricted Content") — looked alarming, but
|
|
`LogLevel trace8` on the vhost showed Apache correctly SNI-matching
|
|
and proxying to the new container with a clean backend `200`;
|
|
resolved itself within seconds (looked like a stale pooled proxy
|
|
connection surviving the container recreate) and was stable across
|
|
repeated checks before the debug logging was removed again.
|
|
|
|
- [x] **fail2ban: `sshd` jail was evadable via low-and-slow attempts** — done 2026-07-19
|
|
Default `findtime=30m`/`maxretry=3` never triggered for `47.76.192.176`,
|
|
which had been hitting `root`/`jayfield` logins roughly every 33 minutes
|
|
for most of a day — just outside the 30-minute window, so failures kept
|
|
aging out before reaching 3 strikes. Confirmed via `fail2ban.log`
|
|
(`Found`/`Ban` counts) that no other jail showed the same per-IP timing
|
|
pattern; a separate, *distributed* single-shot scan on `apache-noscript`
|
|
was noted but left open (see `README.md`).
|
|
Fixed: `/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd-findtime.local` overrides `sshd` to
|
|
`findtime=1d`, `maxretry=4`, `bantime=1d`, kept in its own drop-in
|
|
rather than editing the Debian-packaged jail file. Applied via
|
|
`fail2ban-client reload sshd`; `47.76.192.176` was banned on its very
|
|
next attempt after the change.
|