docs-alpha.jayfield.org/TODO.md

alpha.jayfield.org — TODO

Outstanding hardening items (see README.md for the full service overview). Nothing here is urgent; all are low-risk, no-downtime changes.

• Public static site (jayfield.org/www.jayfield.org) was 401'ing every visitor — done 2026-07-20 Found while auditing which services are reachable without credentials: a stray /var/www/html/.htaccess (AuthType Basic, same AuthName "Restricted Content"/AuthUserFile /etc/apache2/.htpasswd as the intentional dyndns.jayfield.org protection) was silently requiring login for the DocumentRoot both jayfield.org and www.jayfield.org share — /var/www has AllowOverride all, so it took effect with no vhost-level directive needed. File was dated 2025-02-18 (index.html/apache.html themselves are from 2022) — predates every other change in this doc by well over a year, almost certainly a forgotten leftover rather than intentional, and contradicts README.md's own description of both as a public static site. Fixed: moved to /root/removed-configs-backup/htaccess-var-www-html.<timestamp> (recoverable, not deleted — same convention as this file's other removed-config backups). No Apache reload needed (.htaccess is read per-request). Verified both jayfield.org and www.jayfield.org now return 200 with real page content; dyndns.jayfield.org's own (intentional, vhost-level) Basic Auth is untouched and still returns 401 without credentials.

• Lock down the dyndns TSIG key file permissions — done 2026-07-19 /etc/bind/dyndns.jayfield.org.key was 644 (world-readable), holding the shared secret that authenticates dynamic DNS updates for dyndns.jayfield.org with no IP-based allow-update backing it up. Fixed: chmod 640 + chown root:bind (owner was already correct), matching rndc.key's permissions.

• Suppress BIND version disclosure — done 2026-07-19 No version statement in named.conf.options, so dig CH TXT version.bind @ns1.jayfield.org leaked the exact BIND version (9.18.39) — a minor fingerprinting aid for attackers. Fixed: added version "unknown"; inside the options {} block, validated with named-checkconf, and applied via rndc reload. Verified dig CH TXT version.bind now returns "unknown".

• Add response rate limiting (RRL) — done 2026-07-19 No rate-limit {} block was configured. Since allow-query { any; } is required for a public authoritative zone, RRL is the standard mitigation against the server being used for spoofed-source DNS reflection/amplification against third parties. Fixed: added rate-limit { responses-per-second 10; window 5; } to named.conf.options, validated with named-checkconf, and applied via rndc reload. Started with conservative defaults (10/s, 5s window) — revisit if legitimate high-volume resolvers get throttled.

• Add HSTS headers to all vhosts — done 2026-07-19 No vhost sent a Strict-Transport-Security header, leaving a window for on-path SSL-stripping on a user's very first plaintext request to any domain. Fixed: added Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains" to all 6 domain :443 blocks (dyndns, jayfield.org, www, mail, web, cloud) — skipped default-ssl.conf since it's the self-signed catch-all with no real trusted hostname for a browser to pin. Validated with apache2ctl configtest, applied via systemctl reload apache2, verified live with curl -sI against all 6 domains.

• jayfield.org had no :80 vhost of its own — done 2026-07-19 Bare http://jayfield.org fell through to the dyndns default vhost and redirected to the wrong domain. Fixed: added a :80 block to jayfield.org.conf redirecting to https://jayfield.org/, matching the dyndns/mail pattern. Verified: curl -sI http://jayfield.org/ → 302 with Location: https://jayfield.org/.

• SSH: disable root login + password auth — done 2026-07-19 PermitRootLogin yes and PasswordAuthentication yes were both still enabled (the "known deviation" flagged in SETUP.md §1) — every credential-stuffing bot on the internet got a real login prompt to grind against. Fixed: PermitRootLogin no, PasswordAuthentication no, PubkeyAuthentication yes in /etc/ssh/sshd_config (backed up as sshd_config.bak.20260719225249). The Match Group sftp block's own PasswordAuthentication yes was left as-is — separate, already-chrooted, no-shell/no-forwarding accounts, not part of this risk. Validated with sshd -t, applied via systemctl reload sshd, verified live with sshd -T and a fresh key-only connection before considering it done.

• Portainer's :9443 UI is unreachable in HSTS-enforcing browsers — done 2026-07-20 https://alpha.jayfield.org:9443 threw MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT in Firefox with no click-through option ("keine Ausnahme kann hinzugefügt werden"). Root cause: the includeSubDomains HSTS policy sent by the real alpha.jayfield.org vhost (Strict-Transport-Security header, added in the item above) pins the hostname to HTTPS-with-a-trusted-cert on every port, but Portainer (README.md §Docker services) was still serving its stock self-signed cert directly on 9443. Not a MITM — self-inflicted by combining HSTS with an unproxied self-signed service. Fixed: added a portainer A record to db.jayfield.org (SOA serial 2022032216 → 2022032217); recreated the portainer container binding the HTTPS UI to 127.0.0.1:9443:9443 instead of publishing it (old container kept renamed until the new one was verified, then removed, matching the update procedure documented in README.md); added an Apache vhost for portainer.jayfield.org (ProxyPass/ProxyPassReverse to https://127.0.0.1:9443/, SSLProxyEngine on, SSLProxyVerify none + SSLProxyCheckPeerCN off/ SSLProxyCheckPeerName off for the loopback hop to Portainer's self-signed cert) — same pattern as web.jayfield.org/ cloud.jayfield.org (SETUP.md §4/§5); issued a real cert via certbot --apache -d portainer.jayfield.org --redirect; added the standard HSTS header. Left the 8000 edge-agent tunnel port published as-is — no evidence it's in use. Verified: openssl s_client/curl confirm the Let's Encrypt cert (not self-signed) and Strict-Transport-Security header on https://portainer.jayfield.org, http:// redirects 301 to https://, and ss -ltnp shows 9443 bound to 127.0.0.1 only (via docker-proxy), so it's no longer reachable on the public interface at all — access is now exclusively via https://portainer.jayfield.org. One transient wrinkle during rollout: the very first few requests through the new proxy vhost returned a stray 401 with dyndns's Basic Auth realm ("Restricted Content") — looked alarming, but LogLevel trace8 on the vhost showed Apache correctly SNI-matching and proxying to the new container with a clean backend 200; resolved itself within seconds (looked like a stale pooled proxy connection surviving the container recreate) and was stable across repeated checks before the debug logging was removed again.

• fail2ban: sshd jail was evadable via low-and-slow attempts — done 2026-07-19 Default findtime=30m/maxretry=3 never triggered for 47.76.192.176, which had been hitting root/jayfield logins roughly every 33 minutes for most of a day — just outside the 30-minute window, so failures kept aging out before reaching 3 strikes. Confirmed via fail2ban.log (Found/Ban counts) that no other jail showed the same per-IP timing pattern; a separate, distributed single-shot scan on apache-noscript was noted but left open (see README.md). Fixed: /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/sshd-findtime.local overrides sshd to findtime=1d, maxretry=4, bantime=1d, kept in its own drop-in rather than editing the Debian-packaged jail file. Applied via fail2ban-client reload sshd; 47.76.192.176 was banned on its very next attempt after the change.